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Abstract 
 
This paper explores how a trust in government shared by neighbors is associated 
with individual preferences for income redistribution and individual perceptions 
regarding income tax burden. Three measures for trust in government are used: 
“trust in ministries and government agencies”, “trust in diet members”, and “trust 
in members of municipal councils”. After controlling for individual characteristics, 
the key findings are: (1) people are more likely to express preferences for income 
redistribution when trust in government in their residential area is high; (2) people 
are more likely to perceive their tax burden as low when trust in government in 
their residential area is high; and (3) when the sample is divided into high- and 
low-income earners, these results are only clearly observed for high-income earners 
and not low-income earners. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Researchers have paid significant attention to the influence of shared societal 
values on individual’s perceptions regarding redistribution and the welfare state 
(e.g., Gordon, 1989; Wenzel, 2004; 2005a; 2005b; Klor and Shayo, 2010; Feld and 
Frey, 2002; 2007; Luttens and Valfort, 2011). For instance, the degree of trust is 
found to play a key role when tax systems are considered. The greater the level of 
generalized trust in others, the more likely it is that people will pay tax (Scholz and 
Lubell, 1998). Trust in institutional conditions such as government and politics 
make a substantial contribution to establish tax morale and deter tax evasion 
(Scholz and Pinney, 1995; Torgler, 2003; Hammar et al., 2009). Trust and confidence 
in such institutions lead people to prefer the welfare state (Algan et al., 2011) and 
pay tax (Oh and Hong, 2012). Consequently, the size of the welfare state is 
determined partly by the level of social trust (Bergh and Bjørnskov, 2011).2 Recently, 
the seminal work of Algan et al. (2011) showed that there is a “non monotonous 
relationship between trust and the generosity of the welfare sates in OECD 
countries” (Algan et al., 2011, p. 1). That is, countries with low trust in the 
government can have a high public expenditure rate, as do countries with high trust 
in their government. In contrast, countries with medium levels of trust have low 
public expenditure rates. Algan et al. (2011) considered Anglo-Saxon countries and 
Japan to have a medium level of trust, resulting in limited welfare states.  
Within a country, there is a wide variation of income, education level, and 
generation. Hence, there is the possibility that the effect of trust on preference for a 
welfare state varies according to individuals’ demographic groups. Concerning the 
findings of Algan et al. (2011), a question naturally arises: does a medium level of 
trust lead people to prefer a smaller welfare state in Anglo-Saxon countries and 
Japan? As suggested by Alesina et al. (2004), in the United States inequality 
decreased high-income earners’ levels of happiness while inequality did not 
decrease low-income earners’ happiness. Hence, perceptions regarding 
redistribution and welfare states appear to differ between high- and low-income 
earners in countries with medium levels of trust. Based on data from Japan, 
Yamamura (2012b) presented evidence that community participation differently 
influences preferences for redistribution between high- and low-income groups. 
Therefore, in Anglo-Saxon countries and Japan, the different effects of trust 
                                                   
2 Yamamura (2012a) explored the opposite causality concerning how the size of 
government influences the level of trust. 
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between high- and low-income earners are possibly neutralized. To determine any 
policy implications, analyzing the role of trust in government rather than 
generalized trust is a more concrete and suggestive method.3 Thus, it is worthwhile 
to investigate the effect of trust in government on the generosity of the welfare state 
in countries with medium levels of trust. A large number of researchers have 
explored how and why people prefer income redistribution (e.g., Ravallian and 
Lokshin, 2000; Corneo and and Gruüner, 2002; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; 
Rainer and Seidler, 2008; Alesina and Giuliano, 2009; Klor and Shayo, 2010). 
However, no studies have attempted to compare the effect of trust in government on 
the preference for redistribution between different income groups.4  
In addition to preference for redistribution, researchers have attempted to 
assess the determinants of perceptions regarding tax (e.g., Cuccia and Carnes, 
2001; Gemmel et al., 2003; 2004; Feld and Larsen, 2012).5 Both preference for 
redistribution and perceptions regarding tax are thought to be key factors in 
producing effective tax policy and efficient welfare states. However, subjective 
analysis is thought to be biased by various factors, including questionnaire 
construction and respondents’ misunderstandings regarding questions about their 
subjective views. Therefore, it is important to re-examine findings about subjective 
views using other approaches (Algan et al., 2012). To show how and the extent to 
which estimation results for preference for redistribution are reliable, it is 
worthwhile to assess whether estimations of perceptions about tax are consistent 
with those for preference for redistribution. By jointly analyzing the role of trust on 
both preference for redistribution and perceived tax burden, I can provide evidence 
showing how trust systematically influences individuals’ perceptions regarding 
policy on welfare state. In addition to preference for redistribution, the present 
paper also compares its effect on perceived tax burden between these groups. 
For this purpose, the present paper used data from Japanese General Social 
Surveys (JGSS), which included more than 10,000 observations. Most existing 
                                                   
3 Kumlin and Rothstein (2005) asserted that people infer others’ trustworthiness 
from how they perceive public service bureaucrats. 
4 Recent studies have investigated the influence of political conditions on people’s 
perceptions regarding, for example, trust and life satisfaction (Bjørnskov et al., 2007; 
2008a; 2008b; Yamamura, 2012a). It was found that reducing economic inequality 
leads to an increase social trust (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2006). 
5 Voters’ perceptions of their income tax liabilities are systematically biased towards 
over-estimation (Gemmell, 2004). Overestimation of tax burden is negatively associated 
with preferences for redistribution. This association is, however, not statistically 
significant (Gemmell, 2003). 
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papers are based on cross-country data or on data from countries with 
heterogeneous populations. Hence, identifying the effect of perceptions, for example 
perceptions of trust, is difficult. Japan is considered a more racially and culturally 
homogenous society than Western countries. Hence, the use of the JGSS allows me 
to naturally control for heterogeneity and therefore identify the effect of trust in 
government. The key findings of this paper via various specifications estimated by 
an ordered probit model are as follows: (1) people are more likely to express 
preferences for income redistribution in areas where neighbors tend to trust 
government; (2) people are more likely to perceive their tax burden as low in areas 
where neighbors tend to trust the government; and (3) when the sample is divided 
into high- and low-income earners, the first two results are observed only for 
high-income earners and not for low-income earners. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, testable 
hypotheses are discussed. Section 3 explains data and the empirical method used. 
Section 4 presents the estimation results and their interpretation. The final section 
offers some conclusions. 
 
2. Hypotheses 
 
According to the political economy model provided by Algan et al. (2012), 
“everybody wants more social benefits when he expects to be surrounded by more 
civic individuals, because there is less fraud on taxes and benefits and officials are 
more efficient” (Algan et al., 2021, p. 3). Opportunistic uncivic individuals find it 
difficult to hide their income and so evading income tax is less likely if there is trust 
in government—it is a sufficient incentive to deter tax evasion. That is, the 
probability of fraud on taxes seems to depend considerably on quality of government. 
If a government is more corrupt, then it is easier for people to evade paying tax. To 
put it differently, corrupt government reduces the cost for fraud on taxes and 
therefore increases the incidence of fraud on taxes, resulting in economic 
inefficiency. In this situation, people are apt to distrust government. Consequently, 
as suggested by the theoretical model of Oh and Hong (2012), people’s distrust in 
government reduces the willingness to pay taxes. And eventually, individuals are 
less likely to prefer income redistribution.  
If an individual’s household income is higher than the average household income, 
then that individual is considered to belong to a high-income group. The remainder 
are regarded as relatively poor. Income tax is progressive tax in Japan. Hence, 
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high-income earners are obliged to pay higher tax than low-income earners. In 
contrast, there is just a small tax burden for low-income earners. However, 
low-income earners can enjoy the benefit of income redistribution from high-income 
earners. Hence, the net social benefit from paying taxes is greater for low-income 
earners than for high-income earners. Further, even if others evade tax owing to 
distrust toward the government, the tax burden does not outweigh the benefit for 
low-income earners. Hence, low-income earners are less inclined to oppose 
redistribution policies. In contrast, high-income earners are more likely to oppose 
redistribution and are therefore less inclined to prefer redistribution policies. I 
advance Hypothesis 1: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  
Rich people are more inclined to prefer income redistribution when they live in an 
area where residents are more likely to trust government. 
 
In Feld and Frey (2002; 2007), a psychological tax contract was determined on the 
condition that taxpayers and government treat each other with mutual respect and 
honesty. If government does not treat taxpayers as partners on an equal footing, 
taxpayers violate the contract and evade taxes. Tax complexity is associated with 
taxpayers’ perceptions of equity when no explicit justification for its complexity and 
relative economic consequences is offered (Cuccia and Carnes, 2001). If government 
manipulates information and makes tax structures complex for the government’s 
benefit, then taxpayers distrust government. If the government were to take such 
an attitude, which appears to be in contradiction to a fair tax system, then this 
would influence the perceptions of taxpayers (Fehr and Schmidt,1999; Galasso, 
2003; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005). In this situation, people perceive that the tax 
taken is used for the benefit of the government rather than for society as a whole. 
Hence, taxpayers perceive their tax burden as high even if they have civic virtue. To 
put it differently, if taxes paid by people are used effectively and efficiently to 
maximize social welfare, taxpayers are unlikely to perceive their tax as high. This is 
especially so for high-income earners because income tax in Japan is progressive. 
Hence, I advance Hypothesis 2: 
 
Hypothesis 2:  
  Rich people are more inclined to perceive their tax burden as low when they live 
in an area where residents are more likely to trust government. 
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3. Data and Methods 
 
3.1. Data 
JGSS data, which provided individual-level data, are used in the present paper.6 
JGSS have been conducted since 2000 and were designed as a Japanese counterpart 
to the General Social Survey data collected in the United States. A two-stage 
stratified sampling method was used. The JGSS is conducted throughout Japan and 
its respondents are adults aged between 20 and 89 years. This paper used a dataset 
covering 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, and 2008.7 JGSS respondents were 
asked standard questions via face-to-face interviews concerning their individual 
characteristics. From JGSS, researchers can obtain information relating to 
preferences regarding income redistribution policies, perceived tax burden, trust in 
government and politics, marital and demographic (age and gender) status, annual 
household income,8 years of schooling, age, prefecture of residence, and prefecture 
of residence at 15 years of age. A Japanese prefecture is the equivalent to a state in 
the United States or a province in Canada. There are 47 prefectures in Japan, and 
the average value of the variables included in the JGSS can be calculated for each 
prefecture.  
Previous studies have highlighted the significant influence of cultural and social 
background on “happiness” (Alesina et al., 2004), as well as their influence on 
individual preferences for income redistribution (Luttmer, 2011). When comparing 
within-country analysis and comparative analysis between different countries, 
“within country analysis is much less likely to be subject to measurement error due 
to changes in institutional structures of redistributive policies” (Alesina and 
Giuliano 2009, p. 22). Concerning this point, the use of JGSS data in this paper has 
a certain advantage. Trust level is inevitably influenced by historical and cultural 
                                                   
6 Data for this secondary analysis, “Japanese General Social Surveys (JGSS), Ichiro 
Tanioka,” were provided by the Social Science Japan Data Archive, Information Center 
for Social Science Research on Japan, Institute of Social Science, the University of 
Tokyo. 
7 Surveys were not conducted in 2004 and 2007. Surveys were conducted in 2009 and 
2010 but the data are not available.  
8 In the original dataset, annual earnings were grouped into 19 categories, and it was 
assumed in this study that everyone in each category earned the midpoint value. For 
the top category of “23 million yen and above”, it was assumed in this study that 
everybody earned 23 million yen. Of the 11,808 observations used in the regression 
estimations, there were only 116 observations in this category. Therefore, the problem of 
top-coding should not be an issue here. 
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background, which is difficult to completely control. Therefore, the estimation 
results of Algan et al. (2011), based on cross-country data, seem to suffer from 
endogeneity bias. In contrast, Japan shares a common historical and cultural 
background. Therefore, JGSS data enabled comparisons between the influence of 
trust on individuals’ views regarding redistribution policy and tax burden under the 
same historical and cultural conditions.  
The variables used in the regression estimations are shown in Table 1, which 
provides definitions and basic statistics (i.e., mean, standard deviation, maximum 
and minimum value). 
Concerning trust in government and politics, the relevant JGSS questions 
asked: 
 “How well do you trust ministries and government agencies?” 
“How well do you trust diet members?” 
“How well do you trust members of municipal councils?” 
Concerning these questions, respondents could choose one of three responses: 
“Not very much” (assigned a value of 1), “some” (assigned a value of 2) and “very 
much” (assigned a value of 3). Algan et al. (2012) used respondents’ trust levels to 
explore the effect of trust on preference for the welfare state. In their theoretical 
model, the expectation to be surrounded by civic individuals played a key role. To 
directly examine their prediction, one must simply consider the type of individuals 
that actually surround the respondents (Shields et al., 2009). In addition, causality 
between the trust level and preference is ambiguous because the proxy for trust is 
considered an endogenous variable. That is, those who prefer a welfare state are 
possibly likely to trust the government. This inevitably causes endogeneity bias. To 
avoid endogeneity bias, following Yamamura (2012), the present paper uses trust 
level in residential area, rather than the individual’s trust level. I calculated 
average values within each prefecture and used these values as measures of trust in 
government and politics. 
Gini data coefficients for prefecture level household income were calculated 
using data from the “National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure”, 
conducted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (1999). These 
surveys are conducted every 5 years, e.g., 1999, 2004, and 2009. The data used in 
this paper cover the period 2000–2008. Therefore, as explained in the following 
section, I used Gini coefficients for 1999 as an initial value. The average household 
income within a prefecture (AVINCOM) is calculated based on JGSS data. The 
utility of people is thought to be affected not only by one’s own income but also by 
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the income level of neighboring people (e.g., Clark and Oswald, 1996; Luttmer, 
2005). In other words, not only absolute income but also relative income is 
considered to be related to an individual’s utility and, therefore, perceptions. In the 
present paper, both individual-level household income and average household 
income within residential prefectures are controlled for to capture the relative 
income effect. I matched the information regarding individual characteristics 
sourced from JGSS data with prefecture characteristics such as trust in government 
and politics proxies, Gini coefficients, and average income level. Thus, I was able to 
investigate how characteristics of residential area affect an individual’s preference 
for income redistribution and perceived tax burden. 
With respect to individual characteristics, EQUAL are proxies for preferences for 
income redistribution. A question from the JGSS asked: What is your opinion of the 
following statement? “It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the 
differences in income between families with high incomes and those with low 
incomes.” There were five response options, ranging from “1 (strongly disagree)” to 
“5 (strongly agree)”. EQUAL is the values that the respondents chose. Figure 1 
demonstrates the distribution of views regarding political redistribution, and shows 
that the number of respondents who chose “1” or “2” is smaller than those who chose 
“4” or “5”. Thus, the shape of the histogram is skewed towards the right. The JGSS 
also asked the following question: “Do you think the amount of income tax you have 
to pay is high?” There were five response options: “1 (too low)”, “2 (somewhat low)”, 
“3 (about right)”, “4 (somewhat high)”, and “5 (too high)”. TAX is the response 
options chosen by the respondents. The distribution of TAX is illustrated in Figure 2. 
This tells that that most people considered tax as “somewhat high” or “too high”. 
Figures 1 and 2 suggest that people are more likely to prefer redistribution and 
consider tax high. That is, people support redistribution policies if they are not 
obliged to pay tax, which is in line with the argument of expressive voting theory 
(e.g., Tullock,1971; Copeland and Laband, 2002; Sobel and Wagner, 2004; Hillman, 
2010).  
It is plausible to argue that political ideology is one of determinants concerning 
preferences for redistribution and so should be controlled for when preferences for 
income redistribution are estimated (Bernasconi, 2006; Alesina Giuliano, 2009). The 
JGSS also asked: “Where would you place your political views on a 5-point scale?” 
There are five response options: “1 (conservative)” to ‘5 (progressive)”. Based on 
responses to that question, I constructed a proxy for capturing a political ideology 
effect. Political views are captured by dummies: PROG_5 takes the value of 1 when 
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the response is “5”, otherwise 0. PROG_1, PROG_2, PROG_3, and PROG_4 are 
defined in a similar manner. 
As shown in Table 1, the average household income is 6.12 million yen. In the 
present paper, high-income earners are defined as those with a household income 
that is higher than 6 million yen, approximately the average household income. The 
remaining respondents are defined as low-income earners. The distribution of 
household income is illustrated in Figure 3, suggesting that the shape of the 
histogram is skewed to the left. People with a household income between 3 and 4 
million yen are the most common income group. Hence, household income from 0 to 
6 million yen covered both low- and medium-level income earners. Therefore, care 
should be called for concerning the classification between high- and low-income 
earners. 
Table 2 shows differences between the key variables of the high- and low-income 
groups. The table shows that EQUAL for the low-income group is larger than for the 
high-income group by 0.31 on the 5-point scale and is statistically significant at the 
1% level. This is consistent with the expectation that poorer people are more likely 
to prefer income redistribution to increase their welfare. The value of TAX for the 
high-income group is larger by 0.05 on the 5-point scale than the low-income group. 
Further, it is statistically significant at the 1% level. The combined results of 
EQUAL and TAX can be interpreted to represent that low-income earners would 
accept the benefits from redistribution policies at the expense of burdens on 
high-income earners. Turning now to the proxies for trust in government and 
politics, the values for TRUST_MINIS and TRUST_MUNI for the low-income group 
are larger than for the high-income group, and are statistically significant at the 1% 
level. This implies that low-income earners are more likely to live in areas where 
neighbors trust ministers, government agencies, and also municipal councils than 
are high-income earners. 
 
3.2. Econometric Framework and Estimation Strategy 
In Figures 4(a), (b), (c) and 5(a), (b), (c), the vertical axis shows the average 
preference for redistribution (EQAUL) within a prefecture. In Figures 6 (a), (b), (c) 
and 7(a), (b), (c), the vertical axis shows the average perceived tax burden (TAX) 
within a prefecture. In Tables 4(a), 5(a), 6(a), and 7(a), the horizontal rows show the 
average trust in ministers and government agencies (TRUST_MINIS) within a 
prefecture. In Tables 4(b), 5(b), 6(b), and 7(b), the horizontal rows show the average 
trust in diet members (TRUST_DIET) within a prefecture. In Tables 4(c), 5(c), 6(c) 
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and 7(c), the horizontal line shows the average trust in members of municipal 
councils (TRUST_MUNI) within a prefecture. Results based on high-income earners 
are illustrated in Figures 4(a), (b), (c) and 6(a), (b), (c), while those for low-income 
earners are shown in Figures 5(a), (b), (c) and 7(a), (b), (c). A cursory examination of 
Figures 4(a), (b), and (c) reveal a positive association between preference for 
redistribution and trust in government and politics. In contrast, Figures 5(a), (b), 
and (c) do not show an obvious relationship. As for perceived tax burden, Figures 
6(a), (b), and (c) reveal a negative relationship between perceived tax burden and 
trust in government and politics. In contrast, Figures 7(a), (b), and (c) show no 
relationship. These are congruent with the hypotheses raised previously. However, 
these relationships are observed when individual characteristics are not controlled 
for. A more precise examination calls for a regression analysis using individual-level 
data matched with characteristics from residential areas.  
For the purpose of examining the hypotheses proposed the previous section, the 
estimated function of the baseline model takes the following form: 
 
EQUAL im (or TAX im) = 0 + 1 TRUST_MINIS (or TRUST_DIET or TRUST_MUNI) 
m+ 2AVINCOMm + 3GINIm + 4INCOMim + 5AGEim + 6MARRYim + 
7SCHOOLim + 8UNEMPim + 9MALEim + 10PROG_2im + 11PROG_3im + 
12PROG_4im + 13PROG_5im + uim, 
where EQUAL im (or TAX im) represents the dependent variable for individual i and 
prefecture m. Regression parameters are represented by . As explained earlier, 
values for EQUAL and TAX range from 1 to 5 and an ordered probit model is used to 
conduct the estimations. The error term is represented by uim. It is reasonable to 
assume that the observations may be spatially correlated within a prefecture, as the 
preference of one agent may well relate to the preference of another in the same 
prefecture. To consider such spatial correlation in line with this assumption, I used 
the Stata cluster command and calculated z-statistics using robust standard errors. 
The advantage of this approach is that the magnitude of spatial correlation can be 
unique to each prefecture. 
As is exhibited in the correlation matrix of Table 3, the correlation coefficient 
between TRUST_MINIS and TRUST_DIET is 0.76 and statistically significant at 
the 1% level. The correlation coefficient between TRUST_MINIS and 
TRUST_MUNI is 0.72 and statistically significant at the 1% level. In addition, the 
correlation coefficient between TRUST_MUNI and TRUST_DIET is 0.83 and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. These suggest a strong correlation between 
 11 
 
the proxies for trust in government and politics. Therefore, multicollinearity occurs 
when these three variables are incorporated as independent variables at the same 
time. To avoid multicollinearity, one variable is incorporated when the other two are 
not. From Hypothesis 1, these proxies for trust in government are predicted to have 
the positive sign when EQUAL is the dependent variable. Further, from Hypothesis 
2, the proxies for trust in government are expected to have the negative sign when 
TAX is the dependent variable. 
AVINCOM and GINI are included to capture the effects of relative income and 
income inequality within a prefecture. Luttmer (2005) argued that increases in 
average income within a locality lead to reductions in the residents’ welfare. People 
are thought to support redistribution to improve their welfare. In the present paper, 
AVINCOM is expected to have the positive sign when the determinants of EQUAL 
are ascertained. What is more, in comparison with neighbors, individuals perceive 
their tax burden as high. AVINCOM is expected to have the positive sign when the 
determinants of TAX are ascertained. However, it is also plausible to assume that 
an increase in AVINCOM causes people to expect that they can also earn more. As 
suggested by the “prospect of upward mobility” (POUM) theory (Bénabou and Ok, 
2001), people who expect to move up the income scale will not support a 
redistribution policy even if they are currently poor. Hence, the sign for AVINCOM 
may become negative when the determinants of EQUAL are assessed. Further, 
individuals perceive their tax burden as low and so the sign for AVINCOM may 
become negative when the determinants of TAX are assessed. If people wish to 
address inequality, the sign for GINI should be positive in the estimation where 
EQUAL is a dependent variable. The greater the income inequality, the more 
important paying taxes becomes for income redistribution. Hence, GINI is predicted 
to have the negative sign in the estimation for the determinants of TAX. 
Following previous literature (e.g., Ravallian and Lokshin, 2000; Corneo and 
Gruüner, 2002; Ohtake and Tomioka, 2004; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Rainer 
and Seidler, 2008; Alesina and Giuliano, 2009; Yamamura, 2012), the present paper 
used INCOME, AGE, MARRY, SCHOOL, and MALE as independent variables to 
control for individual characteristics. The generosity of the welfare state appears to 
depend not only on economic conditions but also on individuals’ political views. For 
the purpose of capturing political views, PROG_2–PROG_5 are included and 
PROG_1 (conservative view) is the reference group. Liberal views are generally 
considered to support left-wing policies such as political income redistribution. 
Accordingly, the coefficients of PROG_2–PROG_5 are predicted to take the positive 
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sign, with the absolute value of the coefficient PROG_5 to be largest among them. 
 
4. Estimation Results 
 
The estimation results concerning EQUAL are exhibited in Tables 4 and 5, and 
the results for TAX are shown in Tables 6 and 7. Luttmer (2005) pointed out that 
there is “the possibility that cross-section results are driven by selection of people 
who are happier by nature into areas that are relatively poor… One might worry 
that movers may have had something unobserved happen to them” (Luttmer, 2005, 
p. 977). This unobserved factor could cause estimation bias. The JGSS provided 
data regarding not only current residential prefectures but also the residential 
prefectures of respondents at 15 years of age. If the current residential prefecture is 
not the same prefecture at 15 years of age, respondents are defined as “movers”. For 
the purpose of alleviating this bias, following Luttmer (2005), I also conducted 
estimations that excluded all respondents who had moved to a different prefecture. 
Results based on samples of “non-movers” and “movers” are exhibited in Tables 4 
and 6, and those based on samples excluding “movers” are in Tables 5 and 7. In each 
table, results of the specification with TRUST_MINIS, TRUST_DIET, and 
TRUST_MUNI are presented in columns (1)–(3), columns (4)–(6), and columns 
(7)–(9), respectively. Further, in each table, columns (1), (4), and (7) show results 
based on the full sample. After dividing the sample into high- and low-income 
groups, columns (2), (5), and (8) show results based on the high-income sample, and 
columns (3), (6), and (9) present those based on the low-income group.  
In Table 4, the coefficients for TRUST_MINIS, TRUST_DIET, and 
TRUST_MUNI have the expected positive signs in all estimations. Further, they are 
statistically significant for the full sample results and the high-income sample, 
whereas they are not significant for results using the low-income sample. The 
coefficients of the proxies for trust in government, such as TRUST_MINIS, 
TRUST_DIET, and TRUST_MUNI exhibited in Table 4, cannot be interpreted as 
marginal effects and it is difficult to interpret them in the ordered probit model. 
Hence, to determine their economic significance, I need to determine their marginal 
effects. The values for EQUAL range between 1 and 5 and therefore the marginal 
effects of TRUST_MINIS, TRUST_DIET, and TRUST_MUNI vary according to the 
values of EQUAL9 (Greene, 2008, p. 831–835). In the rows below PROG_5, Table 4 
                                                   
9 The marginal effects of TRUST_MINIS, TRUST_DIET, and TRUST_MUNI can be 
calculated for each value of EQUAL. That is, their marginal effect on the probability 
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shows the marginal effects of TRUST_MINIS, TRUST_DIET, and TRUST_MUNI 
on the probability that the value of EQUAL is 5 (respondents “strongly agree” with 
redistribution policy). They are statistically significant in the result columns using 
the full sample and the high-income sample. In columns (1) and (2), the absolute 
values of the marginal effects of TRUST_MINIS are 0.10 and 0.18, respectively. 
This means that a 1-point increase on the 3-point scale for the average value that 
neighbors trust ministers and government agencies leads to a 10% (18%) increase in 
the probability that individuals (high-income individuals) “strongly agree” with 
redistribution policies. In columns (4) and (5), the absolute values of the marginal 
effect of TRUST_DIET are 0.16 and 0.33, respectively. This means that a 1-point 
increase on the 3-point scale for the average value that neighbors trust diet 
members leads to 16% (33%) increase in the probability that individuals 
(high-income individuals) “strongly agree” with redistribution policies. In columns 
(7) and (8), the absolute values of the marginal effects of TRUST_MUNI are 0.14 
and 0.25, respectively. This means that a 1-point increase on the 3-point scale for 
the average value that neighbors trust members of municipal council leads to 14% 
(25%) increase in the probability that individuals (high-income individuals) 
“strongly agree” with redistribution policies. In short, the marginal effect of trust in 
government on preference for redistribution based on the high-income sample is 
approximately two times greater than that for the full sample. 
Concerning the control variables shown in Table 4, AVINCOM produces the 
negative sign in all columns and is statistically significant for results using the full 
sample and the low-income sample. Interestingly, this implies that an increase in 
the average income leads low-income earners to be less inclined to support a 
redistribution policy. It follows from this that, as for redistribution policies, an 
increase in the average income is not related to poorer people’s negative feelings but 
to positive feelings such as expectations of higher earnings. The coefficient sign of 
GINI is negative when using the full sample and the low-income sample, while the 
its sign is positive for the high-income sample. Furthermore, GINI is statistically 
significant only for the high-income sample. This suggests that income inequality 
increases the incentive to support redistribution policies for rich people rather than 
for low-income earners. With respect to individual characteristics, the coefficient of 
INCOME has the negative sign in all estimations, and is not statistically significant 
                                                                                                                                                     
that EQUAL is 5, their marginal effect on the probability that EQUAL is 4, their 
marginal effect on the probability that EQUAL is 3, their marginal effect on the 
probability that EQUAL is 2, and their marginal effect on the probability that EQUAL 
is 1. 
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for the low-income group. This implies that a reduction in income through a policy 
of income redistribution provides rich people the incentive to oppose such a policy. 
The coefficient of SCHOOL has the negative sign and is statistically significant at 
the 1% level. This result is considered to reflect that people with higher education 
are more likely to expect higher future earnings. UNEMP takes the positive sign in 
all estimations, but is only statistically significant for the full sample and the 
high-income sample, implying that the effect of job status on preference for 
redistribution is ambiguous. In line with expectations, a positive sign for PROG_5 is 
observed in all estimations. This suggests that political views affect preferences for 
redistribution. 
Results reported in Table 5 are similar to those in Table 4. With respect to key 
variables for the high-income sample, TRUST_MINIS, TRUST_DIET, and 
TRUST_MUNI continue to show the predicted positive sign and are statistically 
significant. In contrast, for the low-income sample, they are not statistically 
significant with the exception of TRUST_MUNI, although they exhibit the positive 
sign. In other words, only TRUST_MUNI has a statistically significant positive 
effect on individuals’ preferences for redistribution for both the high- and 
low-income groups. As for marginal effects, the magnitude of TRUST_MINIS, 
TRUST_DIET, and TRUST_MUNI are very similar, as exhibited in Table 4. Thus, 
the effect of trust in government on preference for redistribution is more clearly 
observed for high-income earners than low-income earners. This is congruent to 
Hypothesis 1. 
I now turn to Table 6, which exhibits the results of the estimations regarding the 
perceived tax burden. With respect to the key variables, the coefficient signs for 
TRUST_MINIS, TRUST_DIET, and TRUST_MUNI produce the expected negative 
signs, with the exception of columns (6) and (9). What is more, they are statistically 
significant in columns (1), (2), (5), and (8). This suggests that trust in government 
leads high-income earners to perceive their tax burden as low but this is not true for 
low-income earners. Concerning their marginal effect, as presented in the rows 
below PROG_5, Table 6 shows the marginal effect of TRUST_MINIS, TRUST_DIET, 
and TRUST_MUNI on the probability that the value of TAX is 5 (respondents 
perceive their tax burden as “too high”). For the high-income group, the marginal 
effects of TRUST_MINIS, TRUST_DIET, and TRUST_MUNI are –0.29, –0.47, and 
–0.39, respectively. These are interpreted as follows: a 1-point increase on the 
3-point scale for the average value that neighbors trust ministers and government 
agencies leads to a 29% decrease in the probability that high-income individuals 
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perceive their tax burden as “too high”. A 1-point increase on the 3-point scale for 
the average value that neighbors trust diet members leads to a 47% increase in the 
probability that high-income individuals perceive their tax burden as “too high”. A 
1-point increase on the 3-point scale for the average value that neighbors trust 
members of municipal councils leads to 39% increase in the probability that 
high-income individuals perceive their tax burden as “too high”.  
As for control variables, the coefficients of AVINCOM and GINI are not 
statistically significant in all columns. Considering the results of Tables 4 and 6 
jointly reveals that residential economic conditions such as AVINCOM and GINI 
influence preferences for redistribution but do not affect perceived tax burden. The 
reason that the effect of GINI on preference for redistribution differs from that on 
perceived tax is partly explained by expressive behavior (Hillman, 2010). The 
expressive voting hypothesis states that people vote for a certain policy despite the 
fact that the actual implementation of the policy would reduce their material utility. 
This is because individuals vote to express their views regarding particular issues, 
but they do not intend to affect the outcomes of the election (e.g., Tullock, 1971; 
Copeland and Laband, 2002; Sobel and Wagner, 2004). Expressions of support for 
income redistribution by rich people can be considered as suggesting their support 
for the generosity of the welfare state, which increases the utility of rich people. 
However, in expressing their perceptions regarding their tax burden, rich people 
are less likely to show their support for such generosity. Estimations in the present 
paper have been based on survey data. Survey responses are likely to be interpreted 
as expressive because the responses do not affect redistribution policy in any way. 
That is, there is expressive utility from signaling conformity with group-defined 
norms of generosity regarding the welfare state but there is no material loss from 
expressing a preference for income redistribution (Tullock, 1971).  
Turning to individual characteristics, INCOM yields the positive sign for the full 
sample and the high-income sample, and is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
However, it yields the negative sign for the low-income sample and is not 
statistically significant. This is thought to reflect that income tax in Japan is 
progressive. Combined results for the effect of INCOM on preference for 
redistribution and perceived tax burden are in line with the expectation. SCHOOL 
produces the negative sign in all columns. After dividing the sample into high- and 
low-income groups, it is interesting to observe that SCHOOL is statistically 
significant at the 1% level only for the low-income group. This can be interpreted as 
implying the following: the higher an individual’s education level, the more they will 
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earn even if they currently belong to a low-income group. Where the expected 
income is higher than the current income, low-income earners with higher 
education will perceive their current tax burden as low. In contrast, high-income 
earners have already enjoyed the returns from investments in human capital, and 
the probability that they will earn more in the future is low. Therefore, they do not 
perceive their tax burden as low. This is in line with the POUM hypothesis 
(Bénabou and Ok, 2001; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Rainer and Siedler, 2008). 
The positive sign of PROG_3-PROG_5 is statistically significant in columns (1)–(9). 
This shows that the more liberal people are, the greater they perceive their tax 
burden. In my interpretation, liberal people are more likely to consider that the 
government manipulates information to increase tax for the government’s interest 
at the expense of the citizen’s burden. Hence, the level of tax to be paid is higher 
than the ideal amount. 
The results of Table 7 are very similar to those in Table 6, meaning that the 
effect of government in trust on perceived tax burden is robust after controlling for 
endogeneity bias. 
To sum the various estimated results presented thus far, I conclude, as a whole, 
that the estimation results examined in this section are consistent with Hypotheses 
1 and 2, and support them reasonably well.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Civic virtue and perception are found to influence the outcomes of economic 
policy and therefore the effectiveness of economic policy (Aghion et al., 2010; Algan 
and Cahuc, 2009; Algan et al., 2012). However, the majority of previous studies on 
these issues are based on cross-country data or data from countries with 
heterogeneous populations. Hence, identifying the effect of perceptions such as trust 
is difficult. The present paper used data from Japan, a society considered as more 
racially and culturally homogenous than Western countries. Hence, the 
identification of the effect of trust is more convincing here than in previous research. 
The present paper examines the effect of trust in government on individual 
preferences for income redistribution and individual perceptions regarding income 
tax burden. The key findings are summarized as follows: people are more likely to 
express preferences for income redistribution and to perceive their tax burden as 
low when their neighbors are more inclined to trust government. When the sample 
is divided into high- and low-income earners, these results are only clearly observed 
for high-income earners and not low-income earners. 
 17 
 
The main contribution of the present paper is twofold: First, the effect of trust in 
government on views regarding the welfare state varies according to income group 
even when respondents share the same cultural and historical background. Algan et 
al. (2012) assumed that individuals are categorized into two types, either civic or 
uncivic, in an attempt to explain the non-monotonic relationship between trust and 
generosity of welfare states. However, in their regression estimations to explore the 
determinants of generosity of welfare states, the difference between civic and 
uncivic individuals was not directly assessed. The present paper, following Alesina 
et al. (2004) and Yamamura (2012), sheds light on differences in income levels to 
investigate how trust in government affects perceptions regarding the welfare state. 
The present paper shows clear differences between high- and low-income groups. 
Second, considering the determinants for preference for redistribution and 
perceived tax burden established that trust has a more systematic effect on 
perceptions regarding the welfare state than those suggested in existing literature. 
As mentioned above, Japan is generally characterized as a racially homogenous 
society. Aside from such homogeneity, Japan’s historical and cultural backgrounds 
also distinguish it from Western countries. Therefore, to test the generality of these 
findings, it is necessary to examine the hypotheses proposed in this paper using 
other countries with different characteristics. For instance, Anglo-Saxon countries 
such as the United States show a medium level of trust and low generosity from the 
welfare state, which is similar to Japan. However, the United States is regarded as 
a distinctly heterogeneous society. Hence, it is worthwhile testing the hypothesis of 
the present paper using data from the United States, and to then compare those 
results with the present paper. This is a remaining issue that can be addressed in 
future studies. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of preference for income redistribution 
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Figure 2. Distribution of perceived tax burden  
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Figure 3. Distribution of household income 
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Figure 4(a). Relationship between preference for income distribution and trust for 
ministries and government agencies (high-income group) 
 
 
 
Figure 4(b). Relationship between preference for income distribution and trust for diet 
members (high-income group) 
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Figure 4(c). Relationship between preference for income distribution and trust for 
members of municipal councils (high-income group) 
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Figure 5(a). Relationship between preference for income distribution and trust for 
ministries and government agencies (low-income group) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5(b). Relationship between preference for income distribution and trust for diet 
members (low-income group) 
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Figure 5(c). Relationship between preference for income distribution and trust for 
members of municipal councils (low-income group) 
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Figure 6(a). Relationship between perceptions regarding tax and trust for ministries 
and government agencies (high-income group) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6(b). Relationship between perceptions regarding tax and trust for diet members 
(high-income group) 
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Figure 6(c). Relationship between perceptions regarding tax and trust for members of 
municipal councils (high-income group) 
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Figure 7(a). Relationship between perceptions regarding tax and trust for ministries 
and government agencies (low-income group) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7(b). Relationship between perceptions regarding tax and trust for diet members 
(low-income group) 
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Figure 7(c). Relationship between perceptions regarding tax and trust for members of 
municipal councils (low-income group) 
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     Table 1 
Definitions and basic statistics 
 Definitions Mean Standard  
deviation 
Maximum Minimum 
Regional 
characteristics 
     
TRUST_ 
MINIS 
Degree of trust for ministries and government 
agencies: 1 (not very much) – 3 (very much). 
Average values within prefecture where 
respondents reside. 
1.61 0.05 1.77 1.46 
TRUST_ 
DIET 
Degree of trust for diet members: 1 (not very 
much) – 3 (very much). 
Average values within prefecture where 
respondents reside. 
1.40 0.04 1.53 1.32 
TRUST_ 
MUNI 
Degree of trust for members of municipal 
councils: 1 (not very much) – 3 (very much). 
Average values within prefecture where 
respondents reside. 
1.51 0.06 1.66 1.34 
AVINCOM Average household income within a prefecture 
(million yen) 
6.12 0.83 7.99 3.52 
GINI Gini coefficients for 1999 0.29 0.01 0.35 0.27 
Individual 
characteristics 
     
EQUAL Degree of agreement with the argument that the 
government should reduce income inequality: 
1 (strongly disagree) – 5 (strongly agree) 
3.72 1.03 5 1 
TAX Degree of perceived tax burden: 
1 (too low) – 5 (too high) 
4.22 0.84 5 1 
INCOM Individual household income 
(million yen) 
6.23 4.18 23 0 
AGE Ages 53.5 15.2 89 20 
MARRY Takes 1 if respondents are currently married, 
otherwise 0. 
0.82 ___ 1 0 
SCHOOL 
 
Years of schooling 12.2 2.55 18 6 
UNEMP Takes 1 if respondents are currently unemployed, 
otherwise 0. 
0.01 ___ 1 0 
MALE Takes 1 if respondents are male, otherwise 0. 0.49 ___ 1 0 
PROG_1 Concerning political views, it takes 1 if 
respondents choose 1, otherwise 0. 
1 (conservative) – 5 (progressive) 
0.08 ___ 1 0 
PROG_2 Concerning political views, it takes 1 if 
respondents choose 2, otherwise 0. 
1 (conservative) – 5 (progressive) 
0.20 ___ 1 0 
PROG_3 Concerning political views, it takes 1 if 
respondents choose 3, otherwise 0 
0.50 ___ 1 0 
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1 (conservative) – 5 (progressive) 
PROG_4 Concerning political views, it takes 1 if 
respondents choose 4, otherwise 0. 
1 (conservative) – 5 (progressive) 
0.18 ___ 1 0 
PROG_5 
 
Concerning political views, it takes 1 if 
respondents choose 5, otherwise 0. 
1 (conservative) – 5 (progressive) 
0.04 ___ 1 0 
Note: All observations are used. Absolute values of t-statistics are the results of a mean difference 
test between high- and low-income household groups. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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     Table 2 
Comparison of key variables between “high-income group” and “low-income group” 
 High income Low income t-statistics 
EQUAL 3.54 3.85 15.6*** 
TAX 4.25 4.20 2.54** 
TRUST_MINIS 1.61 1.62 6.29*** 
TRUST_DIET 1.40 1.40 0.58 
TRUST_MUNI      1.51       1.52 2.82*** 
Note: Respondents whose annual household income higher than 6 million yen. 
Respondents whose annual household income (or equivalent to) lower than 6 million 
yen. All observations are used. Absolute values of t-statistics are the results of a mean difference test 
between high- and low-income household groups. *** indicates significance at the 1% level.  
  
     Table 3 
Correlation matrix for main variables used for baseline model. 
 EQUAL TAX TRUST_ 
MINIS 
TRUST_ 
DIET 
TRUST_ 
MUNI 
AVINCOM GINI INCOM AGE MARRY SCHOO
L 
UNEMP MALE 
EQUAL 1.00  
 
           
TAX 0.04*** 
(0.00) 
1.00            
TRUST_MINIS 0.04*** 
(0.00) 
–0.01* 
(0.09) 
1.00           
TRUST_DIET 0.03*** 
(0.00) 
–0.01 
(0.14) 
0.76*** 
(0.00) 
1.00          
TRUST_MUNI 0.04*** 
(0.00) 
–0.01 
(0.17) 
0.72*** 
(0.00) 
0.83*** 
(0.00) 
1.00         
AVINCOM -0.06*** 
(0.00) 
0.0001 
(0.93) 
–0.33*** 
(0.00) 
–0.07*** 
(0.00) 
–0.02*** 
(0.00) 
1.00        
GINI -0.003 
(0.69) 
–0.005 
(0.64) 
–0.05*** 
(0.00) 
–0.19*** 
(0.00) 
–0.14*** 
(0.00) 
–0.10*** 
(0.00) 
1.00       
INCOM -0.15*** 
(0.00) 
0.04*** 
(0.00) 
–0.07*** 
(0.00) 
–0.02** 
(0.01) 
–0.04*** 
(0.00) 
0.20*** 
(0.00) 
–0.01 
(0.14) 
1.00      
AGE 0.11*** 
(0.00) 
–0.06*** 
(0.00) 
0.02** 
(0.02) 
0.01* 
(0.06) 
0.01** 
(0.02) 
–0.04*** 
(0.00) 
–0.01* 
(0.06) 
-0.19*** 
(0.00) 
1.00     
MARRY -0.007 
(0.44) 
0.01 
(0.18) 
0.004 
(0.59) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.14) 
0.04*** 
(0.00) 
–0.01* 
(0.05) 
0.23*** 
(0.00) 
–0.02*** 
(0.00) 
1.00    
SCHOOL -0.13*** 
(0.00) 
0.0003 
(0.97) 
–0.11*** 
(0.00) 
–0.09*** 
(0.00) 
–0.11*** 
(0.00) 
0.14*** 
(0.00) 
0.02*** 
(0.00) 
0.33*** 
(0.00) 
–0.42*** 
(0.00) 
0.10*** 
(0.00) 
1.00   
UNEMP 0.01* 
(0.05) 
0.003 
(0.78) 
–0.001 
(0.94) 
–0.005 
(0.54) 
–0.003 
(0.67) 
–0.03*** 
(0.00) 
0.04*** 
(0.00) 
-0.05*** 
(0.00) 
–0.03*** 
(0.00) 
–0.06*** 
(0.00) 
–0.01 
(0.28) 
1.00  
MALE 0.02*** 
(0.00) 
–0.003 
(0.76) 
0.004 
(0.59) 
0.01** 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.35) 
0.01 
(0.22) 
–0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.04*** 
(0.00) 
0.04*** 
(0.00) 
0.11*** 
(0.00) 
0.10*** 
(0.00) 
0.03*** 
(0.00) 
1.00 
Numbers in parentheses are p-statistics. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4  Baseline model: dependent variable is EQUAL (ordered probit model) 
 (1) 
All 
(2) 
High income 
(3) 
Low income 
 (4)  
All 
(5) 
High income 
  (6) 
Low income 
 (7)  
All 
(8) 
High 
income 
  (9) 
Low income 
Regional 
characteristics 
           
TRUST_MINIS    0.31* 
   (1.81) 
   0.64*** 
   (2.59) 
   0.12 
   (0.59) 
        
TRUST_DIET       0.48** 
   (2.46) 
   1.17*** 
   (4.00) 
   0.10 
   (0.33) 
    
TRUST_MUNI            0.44*** 
   (3.72) 
   0.92*** 
   (4.87) 
   0.18 
   (1.02) 
AVINCOM –0.03*** 
(–2.81) 
–0.01 
(–0.42) 
–0.05*** 
(–3.21) 
 –0.03*** 
(–3.57) 
–0.01 
(–1.47) 
–0.05*** 
(–3.49) 
 –0.03*** 
(–3.02) 
–0.01 
(–0.58) 
–0.05*** 
(–3.28) 
GINI –0.43 
(–0.51) 
2.07** 
(1.98) 
–1.84 
(–1.52) 
 –0.21 
(–0.26) 
2.97*** 
(3.08) 
–1.82 
(–1.51) 
 –0.21 
(–0.25) 
2.73*** 
(2.96) 
–1.76 
(–1.48) 
Individual 
characteristics 
           
INCOM –0.03*** 
(–10.6) 
–0.02*** 
(–5.38) 
–0.01 
(–0.99) 
 –0.03*** 
(–10.6) 
–0.02*** 
(–5.33) 
–0.01 
(–0.99) 
 –0.03*** 
(–10.6) 
–0.02*** 
(–5.35) 
–0.01 
(–0.99) 
AGE   0.004*** 
(6.82) 
  0.007*** 
(5.24) 
0.003*** 
(4.38) 
  0.004*** 
(6.83) 
  0.007*** 
(5.18) 
0.003*** 
(4.38) 
   0.004*** 
(6.83) 
  0.007*** 
(5.23) 
0.003*** 
(4.36) 
MARRY   0.04* 
  (1.95) 
  0.04 
  (0.70) 
0.01 
(0.63) 
  0.04* 
  (1.95) 
  0.04 
  (0.74) 
0.01 
(0.63) 
   0.04* 
  (1.93) 
  0.04 
  (0.72) 
0.01 
(0.62) 
SCHOOL 
 
  –0.03*** 
  (–6.59) 
  –0.03*** 
  (–6.14) 
–0.03*** 
(–4.68) 
  –0.03*** 
  (–6.58) 
  –0.03*** 
  (–5.83) 
–0.03*** 
(–4.69) 
   –0.03*** 
  (–6.42) 
  –0.03*** 
  (–5.78) 
–0.03*** 
(–4.60) 
UNEMP 0.16* 
(1.73) 
0.34* 
(1.80) 
0.10 
(0.98) 
 0.16* 
(1.72) 
0.34* 
(1.79) 
0.10 
(0.97) 
 0.16* 
(1.73) 
0.34* 
(1.81) 
0.10 
(0.98) 
MALE   0.07*** 
  (3.17) 
  0.01 
  (0.31) 
0.11*** 
(3.41) 
  0.07*** 
  (3.15) 
  0.01 
  (0.28) 
0.11*** 
(3.42) 
   0.07*** 
  (3.15) 
  0.01 
  (0.25) 
0.11*** 
(3.42) 
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PROG_1 <Reference group>                             <Reference group>  <Reference group>  
PROG_2   –0.005 
  (–0.11) 
  –0.01 
  (–0.24) 
–0.001 
(–0.03) 
  –0.004 
  (–0.10) 
  –0.01 
  (–0.24) 
–0.001 
(-0.02) 
   –0.005 
  (–0.12) 
  –0.01 
  (–0.25) 
–0.002 
(–0.03) 
PROG_3 0.07 
  (1.55) 
0.03 
  (0.42) 
0.09 
(1.40) 
 0.07 
  (1.58) 
0.03 
  (0.42) 
0.09 
(1.41) 
 0.07 
  (1.55) 
0.02 
  (0.38) 
0.09 
(1.40) 
PROG_4 0.15*** 
(3.50) 
0.09 
(1.15) 
0.20*** 
(2.90) 
 0.15*** 
(3.51) 
0.09 
(1.17) 
0.20*** 
(2.91) 
 0.15*** 
(3.49) 
0.09 
(1.12) 
0.20*** 
(2.90) 
PROG_5    0.25*** 
  (3.24) 
   0.22 
  (1.61) 
0.25** 
(2.17) 
   0.25*** 
  (3.27) 
   0.22 
  (1.63) 
0.25** 
(2.17) 
    0.25*** 
  (3.26) 
   0.22 
  (1.61) 
0.25** 
(2.17) 
Marginal 
TRUST_MINIS 
(EQAUL = 5) 
0.10* 
(1.80) 
0.18*** 
(2.59) 
0.04 
(0.59) 
       
Marginal 
TRUST_DIET 
(EQAUL = 5) 
    0.16** 
(2.46) 
0.33*** 
(4.00) 
0.03 
(0.33) 
    
Marginal 
TRUST_MUNI 
(EQAUL = 5) 
       0.14*** 
(3.71) 
0.25*** 
(4.82) 
0.06 
(1.02) 
Wald Statistics 1050   405    288  1064   477    262  1042   405    258 
Observations   11808   4716   7092   11808   4716   7092    11808   4716   7092 
Note: Values are coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered in the prefecture. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. In all estimations, constant and year dummies are included as independent variables but 
are not reported because of space limitations.  
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Table 5.  Baseline model: dependent variable is EQUAL (ordered probit model): People live in the same prefecture they lived in at 15 years of age 
 (1) 
All 
(2) 
High income 
(3) 
Low income 
 (4)  
All 
(5) 
High income 
  (6) 
Low income 
 (7)  
All 
(8) 
High 
income 
  (9) 
Low income 
Regional 
characteristics 
           
TRUST_MINIS    0.39 
   (1.61) 
   0.72** 
   (2.23) 
   0.17 
   (0.65) 
        
TRUST_DIET       0.59** 
   (2.24) 
   1.10*** 
   (2.85) 
   0.31 
   (0.79) 
    
TRUST_MUNI            0.60*** 
   (4.13) 
   0.95*** 
   (3.94) 
   0.43** 
   (2.10) 
AVINCOM –0.03*** 
(–2.60) 
0.01 
(0.76) 
–0.06*** 
(–3.39) 
 –0.04*** 
(–3.72) 
–0.02 
(–0.14) 
–0.07*** 
(–4.06) 
 –0.03*** 
(–3.03) 
0.01 
(0.51) 
–0.06*** 
(–3.75) 
GINI –0.05 
(–0.07) 
3.42** 
(2.20) 
–1.86 
(–1.49) 
 0.15 
(0.19) 
4.14** 
(2.53) 
–1.78 
(–1.46) 
 0.27 
(0.33) 
4.17*** 
(2.80) 
–1.66 
(–1.36) 
Individual 
characteristics 
           
INCOM –0.03*** 
(–8.37) 
–0.02*** 
(–4.74) 
–0.01 
(–1.02) 
 –0.03*** 
(–8.36) 
–0.02*** 
(–4.71) 
–0.01 
(–1.02) 
 –0.03*** 
(–8.36) 
–0.02*** 
(–4.71) 
–0.01 
(–1.03) 
AGE   0.003*** 
(4.07) 
  0.007*** 
(4.15) 
0.002** 
(2.37) 
  0.003*** 
(4.03) 
  0.007*** 
(4.09) 
0.002** 
(2.37) 
   0.003*** 
(4.05) 
  0.007*** 
(4.11) 
0.002** 
(2.36) 
MARRY   0.03 
  (1.27) 
  0.02 
  (0.41) 
0.01 
(0.16) 
  0.03 
  (1.26) 
  0.02 
  (0.43) 
0.01 
(0.15) 
   0.03 
  (1.22) 
  0.02 
  (0.41) 
0.003 
(0.12) 
SCHOOL 
 
  –0.03*** 
  (–5.28) 
  –0.03*** 
  (–4.49) 
–0.02*** 
(–3.51) 
  –0.03*** 
  (–5.19) 
  –0.03*** 
  (–4.39) 
–0.02*** 
(–3.43) 
   –0.03*** 
  (–5.11) 
  –0.03*** 
  (–4.36) 
–0.02*** 
(–3.35) 
UNEMP 0.08 
(0.72) 
0.19 
(0.83) 
0.05 
(0.43) 
 0.08 
(0.71) 
0.19 
(0.83) 
0.05 
(0.42) 
 0.08 
(0.73) 
0.19 
(0.85) 
0.05 
(0.43) 
MALE   0.08*** 
  (3.84) 
  0.01 
  (0.18) 
0.13*** 
(4.03) 
  0.08*** 
  (3.82) 
  0.01 
  (0.20) 
0.13*** 
(4.02) 
   0.08*** 
  (3.85) 
  0.01 
  (0.17) 
0.13*** 
(4.08) 
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PROG_1 <Reference group>                             <Reference group>  <Reference group>  
PROG_2   0.03 
  (0.60) 
  0.03 
  (0.47) 
0.01 
(0.24) 
  0.03 
  (0.62) 
  0.04 
  (0.48) 
0.01 
(0.25) 
   0.03 
  (0.58) 
  0.03 
  (0.46) 
0.01 
(0.24) 
PROG_3 0.08 
  (1.56) 
0.04 
  (0.54) 
0.10 
(1.30) 
 0.09 
  (1.58) 
0.04 
  (0.56) 
0.10 
(1.31) 
 0.08 
  (1.55) 
0.04 
  (0.46) 
0.10 
(1.30) 
PROG_4 0.17*** 
(3.55) 
0.14 
(1.36) 
0.19*** 
(2.63) 
 0.17*** 
(3.56) 
0.14 
(1.38) 
0.19*** 
(2.64) 
 0.17*** 
(3.54) 
0.14 
(1.34) 
0.19*** 
(2.62) 
PROG_5    0.27*** 
  (2.78) 
   0.24 
  (1.48) 
0.26** 
(2.05) 
   0.27*** 
  (2.81) 
   0.25 
  (1.51) 
0.27** 
(2.06) 
    0.27*** 
  (2.81) 
   0.24 
  (1.49) 
0.27** 
(2.07) 
Marginal 
TRUST_MINIS 
(EQAUL = 5) 
0.13 
(1.61) 
0.20** 
(2.24) 
0.06 
(0.65) 
       
Marginal 
TRUST_DIET 
(EQAUL = 5) 
    0.19** 
(2.24) 
0.31*** 
(2.86) 
0.11 
(0.79) 
    
Marginal 
TRUST_MUNI 
(EQAUL = 5) 
       0.20*** 
(4.11) 
0.27*** 
(3.95) 
0.15** 
(2.09) 
Wald Statistics 758    332    327  821    420    284  770    344    305 
Observations   8479   3270   5209   8479   3270   5209    8479   3270   5209 
Note: Values are coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered in the prefecture. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. In all estimations, constant and year dummies are included as independent variables but 
are not reported because of space limitations.  
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Table 6.  Baseline model: dependent variable is TAX (ordered probit model) 
 (1) 
All 
(2) 
High income 
(3) 
Low income 
 (4)  
All 
(5) 
High income 
  (6) 
Low income 
 (7)  
All 
(8) 
High 
income 
  (9) 
Low income 
Regional 
characteristics 
           
TRUST_MINIS    –0.44* 
   (–1.92) 
   –0.94* 
   (–1.93) 
   –0.13 
   (–0.42) 
        
TRUST_DIET       –0.45 
   (–1.53) 
   1.22*** 
   (–2.89) 
   0.25 
   (0.60) 
    
TRUST_MUNI            –0.33 
   (–1.55) 
   –0.99*** 
   (–3.03) 
   0.23 
   (0.67) 
AVINCOM –0.01 
(–0.73) 
–0.03 
(–1.17) 
0.01 
(0.59) 
 –0.003 
(–0.24) 
–0.02 
(–0.92) 
0.02 
(0.88) 
 –0.01 
(–0.42) 
–0.03 
(–1.22) 
0.02 
(0.91) 
GINI –0.61 
(–0.57) 
0.70 
(0.57) 
–1.90 
(–1.35) 
 –0.77 
(–0.71) 
–0.18 
(–0.13) 
–1.73 
(–1.26) 
 –0.70 
(–0.66) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
–1.73 
(–1.25) 
Individual 
characteristics 
           
INCOM 0.01*** 
(2.97) 
0.01*** 
(3.47) 
–0.01 
(–1.29) 
 0.01*** 
(2.96) 
0.01*** 
(3.52) 
–0.01 
(–1.29) 
 0.01*** 
(2.97) 
0.01*** 
(3.49) 
–0.01 
(–1.29) 
AGE  –0.004*** 
(–3.76) 
  0.0001 
(0.05) 
–0.01*** 
(–6.20) 
 –0.004*** 
(–0.80) 
  0.0001 
(0.05) 
–0.01*** 
(–6.16) 
  –0.004*** 
(–3.80) 
  0.0001 
(0.05) 
–0.01*** 
(–6.20) 
MARRY   0.04 
  (1.42) 
  0.09 
  (1.44) 
0.04 
(1.19) 
  0.04 
  (1.40) 
  0.09 
  (1.40) 
0.04 
(1.16) 
   0.04 
  (1.40) 
  0.09 
  (1.44) 
0.04 
(1.15) 
SCHOOL 
 
  –0.02*** 
  (–3.44) 
  –0.0001 
  (–0.001) 
–0.03*** 
(–3.90) 
  –0.02*** 
  (–3.44) 
  –0.001 
  (–0.010) 
–0.03*** 
(–3.82) 
   –0.02*** 
  (–3.49) 
  –0.001 
  (–0.22) 
–0.03*** 
(–3.81) 
UNEMP 0.03 
(0.32) 
–0.23 
(–1.15) 
0.14 
(1.25) 
 0.03 
(0.34) 
–0.24 
(–1.16) 
0.14 
(1.28) 
 0.03 
(0.34) 
–0.24 
(–1.15) 
0.14 
(1.29) 
MALE   0.02 
  (0.65) 
  0.01 
  (0.31) 
0.02 
(0.73) 
  0.02 
  (0.66) 
  0.01 
  (0.33) 
0.02 
(0.72) 
   0.02 
  (0.65) 
  0.01 
  (0.35) 
0.02 
(0.73) 
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PROG_1 <Reference group>                             <Reference group>  <Reference group>  
PROG_2   –0.009 
  (–0.16) 
  0.02 
  (0.29) 
–0.01 
(–0.26) 
  –0.01 
  (–0.17) 
  0.02 
  (0.31) 
–0.01 
(–0.26) 
   –0.009 
  (–0.16) 
  0.02 
  (0.32) 
–0.01 
(–0.26) 
PROG_3 0.18*** 
  (3.74) 
0.21** 
  (2.48) 
0.17*** 
(2.84) 
 0.18*** 
  (3.72) 
0.21** 
  (2.50) 
0.17*** 
(2.88) 
 0.18*** 
  (3.76) 
0.21** 
  (2.55) 
0.17*** 
(2.87) 
PROG_4 0.16*** 
(3.37) 
0.19** 
(2.21) 
0.16** 
(2.42) 
 0.16*** 
(3.37) 
0.19** 
(2.23) 
0.16** 
(2.43) 
 0.16*** 
(3.42) 
0.19** 
(2.30) 
0.16** 
(2.42) 
PROG_5    0.52*** 
  (5.01) 
   0.76*** 
  (4.06) 
0.36*** 
(3.50) 
   0.52*** 
  (5.01) 
   0.76*** 
  (4.07) 
0.37*** 
(3.52) 
    0.52*** 
  (5.02) 
   0.76*** 
  (4.08) 
0.37*** 
(3.50) 
Marginal 
TRUST_MINIS 
(EQAUL = 5) 
–0.17* 
(–1.92) 
–0.29* 
(–1.93) 
–0.05 
(–0.42) 
       
Marginal 
TRUST_DIET 
(EQAUL = 5) 
    –0.17 
(–1.54) 
–0.47*** 
(–2.79) 
0.10 
(0.60) 
    
Marginal 
TRUST_MUNI 
(EQAUL = 5) 
       –0.13 
(–1.56) 
–0.39*** 
(–3.05) 
0.09 
(0.67) 
Wald Statistics 201    134    158  162    144    156  179    125    165 
Observations   7794   3512   4282   7794   3512   4282    7794   3512   4282 
Note: Values are coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered in the prefecture. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. In all estimations, constant and year dummies are included as independent variables but 
are not reported because of space limitations.  
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Table 7.  Baseline model: dependent variable is TAX (ordered probit model): People live in the same prefecture they lived in at 15 years of age 
 (1) 
All 
(2) 
High income 
(3) 
Low income 
 (4)  
All 
(5) 
High income 
  (6) 
Low income 
 (7)  
All 
(8) 
High 
income 
  (9) 
Low income 
Regional 
characteristics 
           
TRUST_MINIS    –0.41 
   (–0.32) 
   –0.76* 
   (–1.67) 
   –0.11 
   (–0.34) 
        
TRUST_DIET       –0.44 
   (–1.12) 
   1.26*** 
   (–2.60) 
   0.44 
   (0.80) 
    
TRUST_MUNI            –0.28 
   (–0.98) 
   –1.02*** 
   (–2.79) 
   0.42 
   (1.04) 
AVINCOM –0.01 
(–0.92) 
–0.05 
(–1.53) 
–0.01 
(–0.22) 
 –0.01 
(–0.55) 
–0.03 
(–1.16) 
0.01 
(0.67) 
 –0.01 
(–0.67) 
–0.04 
(–1.44) 
0.02 
(0.83) 
GINI –0.65 
(–0.55) 
1.34 
(0.91) 
–2.15 
(–1.20) 
 –0.79 
(–0.65) 
0.46 
(0.28) 
–2.14 
(–1.35) 
 –0.74 
(–0.63) 
0.59 
(0.38) 
–2.08 
(–1.30) 
Individual 
characteristics 
           
INCOM 0.01* 
(1.67) 
0.01*** 
(3.30) 
–0.01 
(–1.32) 
 0.01* 
(1.66) 
0.01*** 
(3.33) 
–0.02* 
(–1.70) 
 0.01* 
(1.67) 
0.01*** 
(3.31) 
–0.02* 
(–1.70) 
AGE  –0.003*** 
(–2.59) 
  0.0002 
(0.10) 
–0.01*** 
(–4.28) 
 –0.003*** 
(–2.62) 
  0.0002 
(0.12) 
–0.01*** 
(–4.12) 
  –0.003*** 
(–2.61) 
  0.0002 
(0.13) 
–0.01*** 
(–4.12) 
MARRY   0.06* 
  (1.81) 
  0.06 
  (1.04) 
0.07* 
(1.82) 
  0.06* 
  (1.80) 
  0.06 
  (1.04) 
0.08* 
(1.87) 
   0.06* 
  (1.80) 
  0.06 
  (1.08) 
0.07* 
(1.86) 
SCHOOL 
 
  –0.02*** 
  (–2.83) 
  –0.004 
  (–0.48) 
–0.02*** 
(–2.56) 
  –0.02*** 
  (–2.82) 
  –0.004 
  (–0.53) 
–0.02*** 
(–2.57) 
   –0.02*** 
  (–2.83) 
  –0.005 
  (–0.61) 
–0.02*** 
(–2.52) 
UNEMP 0.03 
(0.28) 
–0.22 
(–0.96) 
0.03 
(0.25) 
 0.03 
(0.30) 
–0.23 
(–0.98) 
0.13 
(1.00) 
 0.03 
(0.30) 
–0.23 
(–0.98) 
0.13 
(1.02) 
MALE   0.01 
  (0.28) 
  –0.02 
  (–0.59) 
0.01 
(0.82) 
  0.01 
  (0.33) 
  –0.03 
  (–0.62) 
0.04 
(1.02) 
   0.01 
  (0.33) 
  –0.02 
  (–0.61) 
0.04 
(1.04) 
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PROG_1 <Reference group>                             <Reference group>  <Reference group>  
PROG_2   –0.008 
  (–0.13) 
  –0.01 
  (–0.15) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
  –0.01 
  (–0.15) 
  –0.01 
  (–0.15) 
0.004 
(0.06) 
   –0.009 
  (–0.14) 
  –0.01 
  (–0.14) 
0.003 
(0.04) 
PROG_3 0.20*** 
  (3.71) 
0.19** 
  (2.11) 
0.23*** 
(3.31) 
 0.20*** 
  (3.70) 
0.19** 
  (2.10) 
0.22*** 
(3.34) 
 0.21*** 
  (3.74) 
0.19** 
  (2.16) 
0.22*** 
(3.32) 
PROG_4 0.18*** 
(2.61) 
0.16* 
(1.73) 
0.23*** 
(2.63) 
 0.18*** 
(2.61) 
0.16* 
(1.73) 
0.20** 
(2.26) 
 0.18*** 
(2.64) 
0.17* 
(1.82) 
0.19** 
(2.24) 
PROG_5    0.51*** 
  (4.83) 
   0.74*** 
  (4.09) 
0.46*** 
(3.28) 
   0.51*** 
  (4.85) 
   0.73*** 
  (4.08) 
0.39*** 
(3.11) 
    0.52*** 
  (4.84) 
   0.73*** 
  (4.10) 
0.39*** 
(3.09) 
Marginal 
TRUST_MINIS 
(EQAUL = 5) 
–0.16 
(–1.33) 
–0.29* 
(–1.67) 
–0.04 
(–0.34) 
       
Marginal 
TRUST_DIET 
(EQAUL = 5) 
    –0.17 
(–1.12) 
–0.49*** 
(–2.61) 
0.17 
(0.80) 
    
Marginal 
TRUST_MUNI 
(EQAUL = 5) 
       –0.11 
(–0.99) 
–0.39*** 
(–2.81) 
0.16 
(1.04) 
Wald Statistics 164     87    130  164    103    173  165    102    173 
Observations   5606   2479   2844   5606   2479   2844    5606   2479   2844 
Note: Values are coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered in the prefecture. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. In all estimations, constant and year dummies are included as independent variables but 
are not reported because of space limitations.  
 
